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Chapter 2:
Max Weber, Bureaucracy, and Corruption    
William D. Rubinstein and Patrick von Maravic   
1. Introduction
Max Weber (1864-1920), the great German sociologist, was probably the
most formative intellectual progenitor of the theoretical framework in which
bureaucracy has been studied and approached during the past century, and
has obvious relevance to our knowledge of corruption and corrupt practices.
It does not appear that Max Weber (1864-1920) wrote anything of a
lengthy and considered nature about corruption in modern societies; his
thoughts on this subject, in so far as they exist, appear to be contained in his
views on bureaucracy and ‘modernity’. In so far as Weber had a view of po-
litical or bureaucratic corruption, then, it is fair to term it an evolutionary
one: corruption was the hallmark of an earlier, more ‘primitive’ stage of soci-
ety, and would eventually vanish with the triumph of a professionalized bu-
reaucracy. Weber’s implicit views on corruption are chiefly contained in his
writings on bureaucracy (Weber 1922) and, to a lesser extent, in his writings
on the ‘vocation’ of politicians (Weber 1948).
Although Weber for the most part insinuates the notions of corruption and
favouritism, the conceptual and empirical implications arising thereof will most
certainly pique the interest of a student of corruption analysis. To trace the dis-
tinct Weberian perspective, our first section will characterize the time and Zeit-
geist of Weber’s writings in terms of nepotism and corruption in Europe and
abroad; the second will link the historical evolution of a Weberian bureaucracy
in England in the nineteenth century to cases of patronage and nepotism. And
what will we learn? First, and as will be argued in the third section, a Weberian
thinking about corruption must start with the distinction between three ideal
types of domination (traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational) that form the
basis for analysing the relationship between rulers and the ruled. Second, the
Weberian perspective on corruption offers both (1) a lens for the analysis of
systemic forms of corruption that have the character of a ‘web of reciprocities’,
where corruption and its causes are located in the wider context of a specific
form of domination and personal rulership (see Huberts, this volume); and (2) a
concept of legal-rational order that lays the foundation for an explicit under-
standing of corruption, one which has the misuse of public power for private
gain and deviance from legitimate order at its conceptual heart.
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2. Weber and his time – The Dreyfus Affair, the Panama
Canal Scandal etc.
Although Weber was well-informed on corruption in local American politics,
to a certain extent, his silence is somewhat surprising, since there were, in
Weber’s lifetime, many corruption scandals in ‘modern’ societies of which
he must have been aware. In France, the Panama Canal Scandal of 1889-92
brought the Third Republic to its knees, and is seen as paving the way for the
Dreyfus Affair a few years later. In it, 104 deputies in the French Parliament
(some sources claim 510 deputies) were accused of taking bribes to keep
quiet about the financial difficulties of DeLessup’s Panama Canal Company,
which hoped to construct the Panama Canal, eventually built by the Ameri-
cans. One of those accused of bribe-taking was Georges Clemenceau,
France’s wartime Prime Minister (Tombs 1996: 457). Some of those accused
of bribe-taking were Jewish financiers, who were singled out for attack by
the same sources on the French right as would launch the more celebrated
Dreyfus Affair three or four years later. In supposedly incorruptible Britain,
there occurred in 1912 the Marconi Scandal, in which four high-ranking
Ministers in H.H. Asquith’s Liberal government, among them future Prime
Minister David Lloyd George, were accused of what would now be termed
‘insider trading’ in shares in the British Marconi Company, just before it was
awarded a lucrative government contract for the construction of wireless in-
stallations around the British Empire. This affair became a cause célébre in
Britain at the time; the four men were acquitted of any wrongdoing by a Par-
liamentary committee which voted along partisan lines. A number of other
scandals involving government finance also occurred in Britain at this time
(Searle 2004: 434-438). But Europe’s corruption was obviously dwarfed by
that which had occurred in the United States since the end of the American
Civil War of 1861-65. American urban governments, in particular, became
virtually synonymous with political ‘bosses’ and endemic bribery and the
misappropriation of public money. Perhaps the most notorious corrupt
American urban machine politician was William M. Tweed (1813-78),
known as ‘Boss’ Tweed. He was the head of Tammany Hall, the Democratic
party’s machine’s headquarters in New York. In 1870-72, just after the Civil
War, Tweed and his allies stole a sum estimated at between $40 million and
$200 million from New York City. They typically operated by inflating the
cost of public works and pocketing most of this inflated sum. Their most no-
torious theft was that in the construction of the so-called ‘Tweed Courthouse’
in New York, which cost taxpayers $13 million, of which $10 million went
into the pockets of Tweed and his friends. Tweed himself was eventually
convicted and jailed, but this type of corruption certainly continued into the
twentieth century, with cities such as Chicago, Jersey City, St. Louis, and
Kansas City (among many others) becoming synonymous with corruption,
kickbacks, and bribery. Many of these political ‘machines’ were built on the
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votes of new non-English-speaking immigrants, who were provided with jobs
and welfare benefits in exchange for political loyalty. The endemic nature of
political corruption at the local (but not to the same extent or as blatantly at
the national) level was remarked upon by many foreign observers of the
American scene, who also noted the virtual abandonment of urban political
life by ‘respectable’ old stock elite Anglo-Saxons, and the dominance of most
urban machines by ethnic politics (See, for instance, Benson 1978: 17-88).
It is difficult to believe that someone as ubiquitously intelligent and well-
informed as Max Weber was not well aware of the extent of political corrup-
tion in many ‘modern’ societies – although Germany itself appears to have
been relatively free of such political corruption, or at least of notorious scan-
dals emerging from accusations of corruption. Perhaps this is why Weber’s
explicit and implicit critiques of corruption were apparently confined to dis-
cussions of bureaucracy rather than of the political process and elections in
‘modern’ nations. Weber held a realistic view of ‘machine politics’ in the
United States, which he toured in 1904 (Gerth/Wright Mills 1948: 14-18). He
visited such cities as Chicago and St. Louis and was fully aware of the cen-
trality of corrupt ‘machines’ to local politics, which he regarded as a neces-
sary evil. He also believed that political ‘spoils’ would necessarily diminish
with the professionalization of the civil service and of welfare provisions
(Gerth/Wright Mills 1948: 18; Weber 1948: 110-111).
In so far as Weber had a view of political or bureaucratic corruption, then,
it is fair to term it an evolutionary one: corruption was the hallmark of an
earlier, more ‘primitive’ stage of society, and would eventually vanish with
the triumph of a professionalised bureaucracy. America’s apparent exception
to this was the result of its anomalous position as a frontier society with ex-
tremely large numbers of impoverished immigrants from more ‘primitive’
societies in eastern and southern Europe, Ireland, and elsewhere, and would
also eventually vanish.
3. Weber, Bureaucracy, and Corruption: How Accurate?
A number of points ought to be made about Weber’s views on corruption.
First, it is consistent with other evolutionary views of the progress of the state
and society which appeared either at about the same time as Darwin’s theory
of evolution, or were influenced by it. In England, an analogous view to
Weber’s, at least by implication, was voiced by the famous English legal
historian Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-88) in his 1861 book Ancient Law.
In Maine’s famous phrase, the evolution of laws in the Western world was
‘from status to contract’, whereby law by divine authority evolved into gov-
ernance by aristocracies and then into formal law codes – a progression not
dissimilar to Weber’s celebrated ‘ideal types’ of authority (see below).
Maine’s view, as a major legal and academic authority in Victorian England
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(he was Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge University), also re-
flected the hegemony of laissez-faire capitalism and of free trade, which
gained ascendancy in Britain in 1846, when the United Kingdom abolished
all, or nearly all, tariffs and the high mark of Victorian England’s prosperity
and industrial zenith were reached. It also had something in common with the
liberal ideology of Maine’s contemporary John Stuart Mill, who argued that
rationality and rational decisions could only grow out of the free and unfet-
tered exchange of ideas and opinions. Weber himself had relatives in Man-
chester who were engaged in the cotton trade, and his brand of conservative
liberalism, seldom associated with German politicians or intellectuals at this
time, was probably influenced by his affinity with England and the English-
speaking world. His ‘Protestant ethic’ theory also plainly saw an affinity
between British, American, and German Protestant capitalists, and would
perhaps implicitly deny the negative and sinister ‘special path’ to modernity
which so many historians have attributed to twentieth-century Germany, al-
beit largely because of events which occurred late in Weber’s life or, more
emphatically, after he died in 1920. Another champion of a distinctly evolu-
tionary view of human society was Karl Marx. In contrast to Weber and
British evolutionary liberals, Marx would surely not have believed that po-
litical or bureaucratic corruption would diminish and wither away in time, at
least in any capitalist society. While capitalists might well favour a system of
laws whose trajectory was from status to contract, the very nature of capital-
ist society ensured the continuation of massive and even pervasive corrup-
tion, and the example of gross corruption in the United States and elsewhere
would have come as no surprise to Marxist theorists, any more than would
attempts by government contractors to succeed through bribery or any other
improper means. A Marxist view of corruption in modern (pre-socialist) so-
cieties was distinctly less starry-eyed than a Weberian view.
Yet there is ample evidence that, broadly speaking, Weber was fairly ac-
curate in his assessment of the gradual but steady diminution in bureaucratic
corruption. This process is well illustrated in England, where a highly corrupt
government infrastructure in the eighteenth century gave way to a govern-
mental structure, and in particular a professional civil service, which were re-
nowned for their impartiality and lack of corruption or corrupt practices.
Britain during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was dominated
by a network of leading government office-holders and their close relatives
who profited enormously and deliberately from government revenue. For in-
stance, James Brydges, first Duke of Chandos (1674-1744), who was Pay-
master of the Queen’s Forces from 1705-13, made £600,000 – an astronomi-
cal sum – from taking a share of everything spent by the British government
on the military during the War of the Spanish Succession. He is regarded as
the earliest British millionaire, and was made a duke, the highest rank in the
British aristocracy. As his entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biogra-
phy notes, ‘public office was regarded as a legitimate source of profits’ at that
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time, far beyond an office-holder’s official salary. As late as the early nine-
teenth century, John Scott, first Earl of Eldon (1751-1838), Lord Chancellor
(i.e., head of the British judiciary and a member of the Cabinet) in 1801-06
and 1807-27, amassed a fortune of at least £700,000 (around £70 million to-
day) by receiving a percentage of all the legal fees coming through England’s
superior courts, far beyond his official salary. The period in British history
down to the ‘Age of Reform’ in c1800-35 was marked by what is often
termed ‘Old Corruption’, with vast perquisites and salaries coming to fortu-
nate office-holders, often closely connected with the British aristocracy, often
for holding positions with no duties and which were often absurd in nature.
For instance, in the 1820s Lord Auckland, an aristocratic landowner, received
a salary of £1400 per annum (about £140,000 today) as ‘Vendue-Master at
Demerara’, in British Guiana, ‘where he had never been,’ as one radical critic
noted, and another £1900 per annum as ‘Auditor to Greenwich Hospital’ for,
in the words of this radical ‘doing nothing.’ (Rubinstein 1987: 275). Hun-
dreds of similar examples existed at the time.
All of the historical evidence suggests that this world of ‘Old Corruption’
was thoroughly reformed by the 1840s, so that virtually nothing was left of it
by the mid-Victorian period. A major landmark along the way was the
Trevelyan-Northcote Report of 1853, named for the politician and senior
civil servant who wrote it, which deliberately attempted to stamp out patron-
age in the British civil service, and recruit future civil servants through ex-
aminations. Its recommendations were enacted in stages between 1855 and
1870. It also became absolutely obligatory by that time that political office-
holders such as Cabinet Ministers not profit in any way from their offices be-
yond their official salaries. By 1860 at the very latest, the kind of gross
profiteering from office made by the Duke of Chandos or Lord Eldon had be-
come illegal. In fact (and notwithstanding the Marconi Scandal and other
such rare events), no British Cabinet minister has ever been known to profit
from corrupt practices: certainly none has ever been prosecuted, or become
notorious for such behaviour. The nearest to an exception was probably
David Lloyd George, Prime Minister 1916-22, who allegedly built up a per-
sonal fortune through the sale of honours (titles of nobility and knighthoods)
just after the First World War. To be sure, many British Cabinet ministers
have profited indirectly from their offices, especially during the past forty
years or so, by gaining lucrative directorships after leaving office, from
writing well-paid memoirs, or (in the case of Prime Ministers) embarking on
lucrative lecture tours, but as a rule these have occurred after retirement from
office. Just as remarkably, British civil servants appear to be unusually hon-
est, and it actually very difficult – perhaps impossible – to point to more than
a handful of occasions when civil servants profited illegally from their posts
beyond their official salaries. This generalisation is also true of British ad-
ministrators throughout the Empire, when it existed. Obviously, it is entirely
possible that some dishonest civil servants ‘got away with it’, and some as-
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pects of local politics in Britain, especially in cities where one party is per-
manently likely to be elected, are known for their corrupt practices, at least in
a minor way. Nevertheless, the British governmental and civil service ad-
ministrative structures do appear to have evolved, from c1800-1900, in a
way consistent with the Weberian type bureaucracy (see below). There are a
number of reasons for this which may have been peculiar to Britain. Most
Cabinet ministers of this period and virtually all civil servants were educated
at a British ‘public school’ and at Oxford or Cambridge universities, and ab-
sorbed the ‘gentlemanly’ code instilled there. Many Cabinet ministers were
very wealthy, and did not need to engage in corrupt practices when these be-
came illegal. The official system of auditing of accounts, Parliamentary over-
sight, a free press, and an articulate Opposition made corrupt behaviour very
difficult, especially on a large scale, with the penalties for being caught very
severe, both in terms of long prison sentences and notoriety for the offender
and his family in ‘Society’. Administrative civil servants, although generally
drawn from the lower part of the middle class, were reasonably well paid to
start with and very well paid in senior positions. They enjoyed lifetime tenure
and could look forward to an honour such as a knighthood upon retiring, and
a generous pension. Few were prepared to sacrifice this for the rewards of
petty or even large-sale corrupt practices. It is a fact that no, or virtually no,
such scandal ever occurred in Britain.
British political behaviour was also reformed in a way consistent with
Weber’s theories. Eighteenth century politics in Britain was marked by wide-
spread corruption and bribery, with only small numbers of adult males having
the vote, and thus readily open to various forms of payment in exchange for
their votes, elections being held in public rather than being secret. Defenders
of this situation justified it as indicative of ‘British liberties’: as the famous
historian Sir Lewis Namier put it, ‘No one bribes when he can bully’. These
practices, too, gradually disappeared in the nineteenth century with, for in-
stance, the secret ballot being introduced in 1882 and virtually all adult males
given the vote by 1884, the open briber of voters then being both illegal and
prohibitively expensive.
The Weberian trajectory of Britain, from widespread corruption to the ap-
parent near-complete absence of it, might or might not have occurred else-
where. The violent revolutions experienced in modern Europe, and the pre-
1789 traditions of powerful autocratic royal or noble rule, were quite differ-
ent from the relatively peaceful evolution of Britain’s institutions. Yet Weber
clearly believed that the German bureaucracy of his time exhibited the char-
acteristic of freedom from corruption depicted in his conception of a legal-
rational bureaucracy. Broadly speaking, Weber appears to be correct, at least
in his depiction of the bureaucracies and, less emphatically, the state struc-
tures of advanced, ‘modern’ nations. All international indices of corruption in
the contemporary world invariably show that the least corrupt nations and bu-
reaucracies have the most advanced socio-economic statistics and statistical
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indicators, in terms of literacy and levels of education, high per capita in-
comes, urbanisation, welfare provisions, a free press and media, and so on. It
is, overwhelmingly, Third World nation-states, especially in Africa and the
Arab world, which are found to be the most corrupt, and also score lowest on
most indices of ‘modernisation’. This may seem self-evident, but, as noted in
the British case, Western nations are not necessarily free from even gross
corruption at relatively ‘advanced’ stages of their development.
Many observers would, however, claim that Weber was being far too san-
guine and optimistic in his assessment of the absence of corruption in ‘mod-
ern’ bureaucracies and state structures. Certainly innumerable examples of
corruption, in some cases (such as Italy) reaching to the highest officials in
the land, have been alleged or proven in recent decades in advanced Western
societies, while corruption at all levels is apparently endemic throughout
much of the Third World. Many factors have become evident since Weber
lived and wrote – he died at the age of only fifty-six in 1920 – which were
not apparent then, and particularly during the past thirty or forty years. These
include the phenomenal increase in wealth and incomes among the rich in the
age of ‘globalisation’; the vast size of state bureaucracies, with their vast
contracts for military and civilian works; and universal independence granted
to Third World and non-Western societies, often rich in natural resources,
whose leader and state bureaucracies either entirely lack the Western tradi-
tions of immunity from corruption or, indeed, represent societies where brib-
ery and gift-giving are the norm. Weber also lived before the era of highly
‘professional’ international organised crime rings and money-laundering, or
the ability to transfer illegal or semi-legal funds to international and anony-
mous banking centres and tax havens. In societies such as post-Communist
Russia, the very era since the end of the Soviet Union in 1989-91 is often
termed that of the ‘republic of oligarchs’, where incredibly vast fortunes have
been made almost overnight, often through violent and corrupt means, in a
society where total state control of the economy was the invariable rule for
nearly seventy-five years. Yet even in Russia, the past few years have appar-
ently seen a more settled, orderly, and legalistic state apparatus than was the
case a few years ago. For all of what might be termed its wishful thinking and
unreality, Max Weber’s depiction of evolutionary trends and norms, at least
in the European and Western world, appears to have considerable merit and
accuracy.
Weber’s broader views on bureaucracy and rationality are, however, cer-
tainly not unproblematic insofar as he has attempted to link the two as a vir-
tually inevitable evolutionary process. While many Western bureaucracies
have seemingly eschewed the grosser forms of corruption, they have also, at
least in some political milieus, been complicit in far worse crimes and prac-
tices. The ease with which the German bureaucracy and civil service of the
Wilhelmine and Weimar periods became vehicles for enacting Nazi atrocities
and criminality is notorious, while bureaucracies in other totalitarian regimes,
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including the Soviet Union and its satellites, have also similarly acted as rub-
ber stamps for the enormities of their governments. Indeed, there seems to be
a general rule that bureaucrats will avoid personal corruption far more readily
than they will avoid the crimes against humanity, including mass murder,
carried out by their governments. There are a number of reasons for this. Per-
sonal corruption can often be readily identified and punished, while coopera-
tion in government-sanctioned programmes of persecution or invasion are
rewarded; the very ambiance of totalitarian societies, and especially, perhaps,
their bureaucracies, is wholly unsympathetic to personal dissent; even if a bu-
reaucrat is personally opposed to a governmental policy, he has the excuse of
the necessity to obey orders and of deferring to higher authority. It may be
that (as Namier suggested) personal corruption is tolerated, at least in the
West, in societies with some degree of personal liberty and economic free-
dom, while unquestioning obedience is the invariable rule in totalitarian so-
cieties, whether to the state or in the slightest toleration of corrupt practices
initiated from below or outside the state apparatus.
4. Analyzing Corruption in a Weberian Style?
The preceding historical perspective on Weber’s work establishes his aware-
ness of nepotism and corruption. Indeed, patronage and favouritism were of-
ten regarded as normal. The rise of bureaucracy in England, Prussia, the
United States, and France (Silberman 1993) paved separate paths for public
versus private life, and within the former arose an understanding of corrupt
behaviour in government. The remaining sections will inspect the conceptual
side of Weber’s recognition of corruption and illustrate how his ideas are use-
ful to modern societies.
Weber was interested in how legitimate political and economic order is
created and maintained. His work illustrated how a society effectively re-
strains certain forms of behaviour and encourages others (Scott 1972: 16).
His main focus was on social relationships between, for example, the ruler
and the ruled, how they relate to each other, and how they form an under-
standing of legitimate order. Stable social relationships are explained by the
perception of legitimate order, which guides behaviour and makes it predict-
able. Legitimate and stable order is therefore based on the existence of formal
and informal rules. It is not accounted for by actors’ interests or habits so
much as it is by the acceptance of social regulatory systems. Obedience
within different systems of domination in Weber’s view is therefore firmly
linked to perceptions of legitimacy. For Weber it was clear that societies
change and progress by the process of rationalization, which in turn can
change the sources of legitimacy as well as create friction. His wide-ranging
comparative and historical approach to different types of legitimate political
order, and his writings on the operating modes and administrative arrange-
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ments by which rulers exert authority (Eisenstadt 1959; Fry/Raadschelders
2008; Schröter 2007; Weber 1972) have been extremely influential on social
scientists when thinking about different types of legitimate order.
A Weberian thinking about corruption begins with the distinction between
his ideal types of domination: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational. The
three form the basis for the analysis of the relationship between the rulers and
the ruled. Briefly said, under traditional rule everything is set in its place;
power is inherited within a clan structure that often forms a centuries-long
dynasty. All members know their places and what is expected of them.
Charismatic societies rely on one great leader or set of cooperative leaders
whose (often brilliant) tenure is terminated only by death. Examples are
founders of religious movements, military leaders, and popular party politi-
cians. Charismatic authority often goes hand in hand with a mission, a prom-
ise of salvation, or an explicit ideology – ends that are not important to the
patrimonial type of rule. People obey charismatic leaders because they firmly
believe in the leaders’ magical power or are drawn to their exceptional per-
sonal attributes (Weber 1972: 221-225), but the dependence on a single per-
son and his or her charisma makes it a fragile type of rule. In contrast, (bu-
reaucratic) power in legal-rational rule is exerted on the basis of clear rules
whereby the ends justify the means of execution. The instrument is run by
competent, trustworthy experts and is guaranteed by professional self-
governance ruled by meritocracy.
Charismatic domination does not seem to offer a discrete perspective on
corruption because elements of patronage can be a strategic part of this type
of domination as well. The most fruitful distinction for the analysis of cor-
ruption derives from the traditional and legal-rational types of domination.
The two types offer a conceptual departing point for an analytical distinction
between (1) a public-office-based definition of corruption as the misuse of
public office for private gain (Gardiner 2005; Nye 1967: 419) under legal-
rational rule, and (2) a favouritism-based definition of corruption that forms
an inherent part of a patrimonial ‘strategy of rulership’ (Roth 1968: 197) to
win personal loyalties by distributing material rewards (commonly known as
nepotism (family) or patronage (friends)). In defining the public official’s
role within the legal-rational system of a bureaucracy, Weber emphasized the
contrasts to common practices in so-called pre-bureaucratic systems, the most
important of which is traditional domination. Jacob van Klaederen, for exam-
ple, has described the Inca society as patrimonial, in which a ruler ‘legiti-
mately’ engages in a self-centred distribution and acquisition of resources.
This type of behaviour must be considered a genuine strategy of personal rul-
ership that no one would challenge as corrupt in the legal-rational sense; it
legitimately establishes order in a hierarchical society (van Klaveren 2005:
83). All too often Weber’s work has been associated with the public-office
definition of corruption rather than the favouritism-based one, despite the fact
that the latter offers a compelling additional perspective for the analysis of
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patrimonial types of corruption in modern states. Unfortunately, it has been
mostly applied to developing countries, which are generally conceived as tra-
ditional societies (e.g. Médard 2005). This undermines the heuristic useful-
ness of Weber’s ideal types for the analysis of modern societies.
Weber’s types of domination are also too often understood as precise de-
scriptions of reality, which is a misinterpretation. They are ideal, not real;
they are neither descriptions of reality nor representations of a normatively
desirable state. There are various ways to describe their usefulness: (1) they
distinguish and delineate social phenomena by describing their core elements,
(2) they serve as an analytical tool of counterfactual thinking to discern the
important elements of a phenomena within a vast sea of empirical facts, (3)
they are idea constructs that help put the chaos of social reality in order
(Rossi 1987), (4) and they can be a measure of empirical deviation from the
ideal in comparative studies (Eliaeson 2000). Conceptually they are pure; in
reality, they usually occur in mixtures (Weber 1922: 45). The categories of
domination should therefore be independent of other distinctions; think, for
example, of classical distinctions in political science between democracy,
authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. Within each of the latter the legitimacy
of a ruler can be based on one or another type of domination. Weber was
critical of the notion that bureaucracy and democracy were two sides of the
same coin, and showed, for example, that feudal lords used the technique of
bureaucracy to govern (see Weber 1922: 36). Without blurring the conceptual
difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes, Weber’s ideal
types allow us to recognize the common elements within them.
4.1 Favouritism, Personal Rulership, and Web of Reciprocities
The belief in the sanctity of tradition, heritage, and customs forms the basis
of patrimonial domination, in which the succession of rulers is determined by
birth, clan membership, and personal loyalty. Rather than abstract definitions
of merit or certificates of education leaders are recruited on the basis of per-
sonal relationships (Weber 1972: 219-221).
Guenther Roth’s work on recently decolonized countries opens a con-
ceptual pathway from Weber’s work to an analysis of corruption in modern
states. Roth reconsiders Weber’s concept of patrimonial rulership and ob-
serves that in many decolonized states ‘traditionalist legitimacy has disinte-
grated’ (Roth 1968: 194) and that Weber’s sociology of Herrschaft (domi-
nance) deals not only with ‘beliefs in legitimacy but also with the actual
operating modes and administrative arrangements by which rulers ‘govern’,
not just ‘rule’’ (Roth 1968: 195). Roth argues against a narrow interpretation
of patrimonialism anchored solely in the ideas of tradition and hereditary
succession. Instead he suggests using ‘personal rulership’ as a subcategory of
patrimonialism. Here, personal loyalty does ‘not require any belief in the
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ruler’s unique personal qualification, but is inextricably linked to material in-
centives and rewards’ (Roth 1968: 196). Roth’s modernization of Weber’s
patrimonial rule offers an opportunity to ‘transcend[s] the dichotomy of tra-
dition and modernity’ (Roth 1968: 197) and the concept can therefore be used
for contemporary regimes.
In a Weberian-Rothian perspective, corruption must therefore be more
broadly seen as a strategy to exert power and influence people through ‘con-
nections [and] favouritism’, as Roth has shown in ‘Personal Rulership, Pa-
trimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States’ (Roth 1968: 203). This
favouritism-based perspective teaches us that corruption can be viewed not as
a singular individual failure but as a coherent strategy to achieve obedience
and regime stability with favouritism having ‘a logic and rules of its own’
(Eilbaum 2006: 4).
Because a public-private distinction is non-existent, patrimonial rulers
consider ‘the state’ – or everything they have control over – as a means to
maximize their personal profit. Weber described the office at the time of the
Middles Ages as a source for extracting private rents (‘ausbeutbaren Renten-
und Sportelquelle’ (Weber 1922: 14, 18-19). This extends to the office-
holder’s staff as they extract rents from the office and consider it their prop-
erty. It is not, of course, a static situation: a patrimonial ruler is in permanent
struggle with his staff over ultimate control, using favouritism as the means
to it (Roth 1968: 195). Guenther Roth observed this typical form of personal
rulership as an ‘ineradicable component of the public and private bureaucra-
cies of highly industrialized countries’ (Roth 1968: 196), noting especially
‘old urban machines’ such as Chicago or Detroit:
‘The old urban machines are a familiar example. They had, of course, some kind of tradi-
tionalist legitimation because of the immigrants’ Old World ties, but they functioned pri-
marily on the basis of personal loyalty – plebeian, not feudal – and material reward; offices
were distributed by a noncharismatic and nonbureaucratic ruler, and occupying them
amounted to holding a benefice. The boss might have had great power, but his legitimacy
was precarious; thus he had little authority and had to envelop his ‘clients’ in an intricate
web of reciprocities’ (Roth 1968: 198).
The ruler distributes favours by either selling or giving ‘jobs’, ‘benefices’ or
‘offices’ that may be used partly for personal gain but demand loyalty to the
ruler throughout their tenure. This ‘web of reciprocities’, as Roth termed it,
obliges the ruler and the ruled to be co-dependent. In the case of ‘machine
politics’ political coalitions use their influence to reward supporters with
public goods, a well-known reflex phenomenon of political parties after an
election victory (Krebs 2005). J.C. Scott argues that this type of political
‘machine’ aims at the ‘political consolidation of the beneficiaries of the pa-
tronage and graft system’ (Scott 1969: 63) and points out that it cannot at-
tribute for more the random or sporadic forms of corruption that often occur
in administrative systems. Taking this point seriously means that not all
forms of corruption fall under personal rulership or machine politics, and that
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the Rothian perspective emphasizes a more stable and systemic form of fa-
vouritism-based corruption whose practices are not considered illegitimate
and ultimately contribute to the stability of the system.
Nicolás Eilbaum seemed to have this in mind when he employed the con-
cept to research corruption in Argentina. He demonstrated that the Menem
administration was stable and illegitimate at the same time, despite the lack
of charisma and rationality (Eilbaum 2006).
‘Corruption can thus be made sense of as part of the government’s pursuit of stability in a
context where no source of legitimacy was available … [It is] inherent to a political regime
where rulership is supported by the personalized distribution of resources, insofar as no
other bases of domination exist’ (Eilbaum 2006: 6).
4.2 Legal-Rational Rule, Corruption, Deviance from Legitimate
Order
An explicit understanding and legally-sanctioned definition of public-office-
based corruption comes into existence with the separation of private house-
hold and public office, which occurs with the rise of a bureaucratic system.
Weber’s feudal system is characterized by the appropriation of benefices to
officeholders; the legal-rational system is dominated by an explicit rule sys-
tem that sanctions the use of public power for private means. As the ideal bu-
reaucracy is necessarily linked to the notion of legal authority, legitimacy is
based on the rule of law. This means that abstract rules are applied to par-
ticular cases, and the impersonal order is dominated by a legal code that
claims obedience from members of the organization. Corruption means there-
fore deviance from legitimate order.
The legal-rational type of domination (Weber 1972: 217-219) stands in
stark contrast to personal rulership types where belief in reason, a constitu-
tionally-regulated legislation, professional training, and efficiency do not
hold sway. Weber saw bureaucracy as the most rational instrument of exe-
cuting legal authority (Weber 1922: 24), the most efficient form of organiza-
tion yet devised by men.1 In its most advanced state the bureaucracy would
be driven sine ira ac studio, ‘without anger or jealousy’ (Weber 1922: 26), a
phrase that emphasizes its professional, impersonal, passion-free, rational
machinery. Highly trustworthy, professional experts within a system of
meritocracy are best to run the instrument. The guiding norm of bureaucratic
authority is a strict hierarchy with a clear separation of tasks and functions
                                                          
1 Despite Weber’s admiration for the rationality and efficiency of bureaucracy, he was aware
of its flaws, among them: (1) the potential for routinisation to hamper the personal develop-
ment of the organization’s members; (2) the capacity for a powerful machinery to overstep
its defined function, ignoring that bureaucracy is subject to the rule of law and not in charge
of it; and (3) an enthronement of bureaucracy such that it could be used for evil as well as
good (Weber 1922: 34-35; see also Bauman 2001).
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following the principle of division of labour. The office, with its specific du-
ties, forms the cornerstone of each organization. Moreover, the resources of
the bureaucracy are distinct from those of its members; owning the means of
administration (Weber 1922: 13) would allow the office to be sold, passed on
by heredity, or misappropriated. As summarized by Reinhard Bendix’s précis
of Weber’s views,
‘officials and other administrative employees do not own the resources necessary for the
performance of their assigned functions but they are accountable for their use of these re-
sources. Official business and private affairs, official revenue and private income are sepa-
rated … Officers cannot be appropriated by their incumbents in the sense of private prop-
erty that can be sold and inherited’ (Bendix 1960: 419).
Corruption from this perspective, although never explicitly stated by Weber,
is related in the eyes of many to deviation from formal rules and duties of a
public role for personal gain (see Heidenheimer/Johnston 2005: 77-78;
Mény/de Sousa 2001: 2824; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Nye 1967: 419). Many
political scientists and criminologists have stuck to a public-office centred
definition that focuses on forms of behaviour that violate legal standards. One
prominent example is the often-quoted definition of corruption by Joseph S.
Nye:
‘Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or vio-
lates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes
such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position
of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than
merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding
uses)’ (Nye 1967: 419).
The advantage of public-office definitions is that they help to disentangle the
complexity of corruption by offering a clear heuristic. They are stable and
objective, often resembling the Penal Code (cf. Huisman/Vande Walle,
chapter 8). As critics have pointed out, however, legal norms often reflect the
ethics of a certain group and are thus socially disputable. Furthermore, they
leave room for interpretation because they relate to a tangible value system of
a specific group at a certain time (see Mény/de Sousa 2001: 2824).
With regard to the causes of public-office corruption we are not left with
an elaborated concept but Weber’s remarks in ‘The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism’, attribute corruption to individual failure, behaviour un-
worthy of true professionals and aristocrats at the bureaucratic apex (Windolf
2003: 190):
‘The impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of
money, has in itself nothing to do with capitalism. This impulse exists and has existed
among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, no-
bles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. One may say that it has been common to all sorts
and conditions of men at all times and in all countries of the earth, wherever the objective
possibility of it is or has been given’ (Weber 2001/1904: xxxi (italics added)).
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Weber did not, however, hold the opinion that avarice or ‘unlimited greed for
gain’ (Weber 2001/1904: xxxi) was identical to capitalism but that ‘capital-
ism may even be identical with the restraint, or at least rational tempering, of
this irrational impulse’ (Weber 2001/1904: xxxi). Irrational greed is trans-
formed by the institutions of capitalism into the rational ‘pursuit of profit,
and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic en-
terprise’ (Weber 2001/1904: xxxii). Quite analogous to Weber’s depiction of
capitalism as the rational form of profit-making in which passion, avarice,
and greed are tamed by institutions, Weber viewed bureaucracy as the legal-
rational form of executing power and repressing ‘irrational behaviour’ in a
stahlhartes Gehäuse (iron cage). The metaphor of an iron cage refers to in-
creasingly rational societies, which leave little room for personal attributes
such as passion, love, or personal feelings but are dominated by clear means-
end logics (Silberman 1993). Taken seriously, the metaphor implies that cor-
ruption occurs when the system of legal-rational dominance is not yet com-
plete; loopholes remain for the bureaucrat’s private motives. In other words,
the distinction between the private and public role is not clearly delineated,
offering a gateway for behaviour that deviates from official behaviour. The
deviant behaviour might stem from rules that are not explicit enough, subop-
timal methods of sanctioning and supervision, an inferior system of recruit-
ment, or an organizational ethos that has not been fully penetrated by the of-
ficial structure.
It would not do justice to a Weberian reasoning to restrict public office
corruption to modern bureaucracies and the ‘web of reciprocities’ to patrimo-
nial societies. As previously stated, logics and types of dominance merge and
form hybrids. Modern ‘cages of reason’ can be prone to ‘webs of reciprocity’
as well as a logic of patrimonialism. Government departments in many West-
ern democracies, for example, are staffed with officials that fulfil the criteria
of civil servants and are therefore important ingredients of the bureaucratic
rationality; they can also be occupied by political appointees who act as
transmission belts between administrative and political rationalities. Political
scientists have termed this phenomenon ‘politicization’: public officials pay
greater attention to politics and politicians are interested in ensuring that civil
servants are compatible with their own partisan and policy preferences (Pe-
ters/Pierre 2004: 1). This does not imply that patrimonialism is the immediate
consequence of politicization, but it can be a gateway for conflicts of inter-
ests and webs of reciprocities if for example staffing is influenced by party
considerations rather than merit.
5. Conclusion
The Weberian distinction between a rational-legal and a patrimonial type of
domination offers a conceptual departing point to distinguish between (1) a
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public-office based definition of corruption as the misuse of public office for
private gain under legal-rational rule, and (2) a favouritism-based definition
of corruption that forms an inherent part of a patrimonial ‘strategy of ruler-
ship’ to win personal loyalties by distributing material rewards, commonly
known as nepotism or patronage.
The favouritism-based perspective on corruption offers a lens for the
analysis of a systemic form of corruption that has the character of a ‘web of
reciprocities’: corruption and its causes are located in the wider context of a
specific form of domination and personal rulership. Corruption is thus a strat-
egy to influence and exert power over people through forms of favouritism
and patronage. This perspective enlightens us to a corruption that is not a
failure of individuals but a coherent strategy with its own rules and logic to
achieve obedience and contribute to the stability of a regime. It does not ac-
count for the more random or sporadic forms of corruption that often occur in
administrative systems. The perspective emphasizes a specific form of a
more stable and systemic corruption.
An explicit understanding and legally-sanctioned definition of corruption
in the legal-rational sense comes into existence when the private household
and the public office become separate entities, a process that occurs with the
rise of a bureaucratic system. Corruption takes place when the system of le-
gal-rational dominance is not sufficiently diffused, leaving loopholes that will
be exploited by the bureaucrat’s private motives. The distinction between the
private and the public role is not clearly delineated and the fuzzy line offers a
gateway for behaviour that deviates from a person’s official administrative
role.
In modern governmental organizations the clear distinction between these
two types of dominance does not always reflect reality, and patrimonial and
legal-rational modes merge. Max Weber’s explicit contribution to the under-
standing of the logic of different systems of domination stands undisputed,
however his contribution to an understanding of corruption in modern states
– albeit a challenge to a certain extent – has had mainly an implicit impact on
many students and their definition of corruption but will hopefully receive
more explicit attention in the future.
